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OR TREASURE CHEST?: CIRCUIT

COURTS FACE 28 U.S.C. § 1367's EFFECT ON MULTIPLAINTIFF DIVERSITY ACTIONS
[The statute's] language is plain and unambiguous. What the Government asks is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by
its scope. To supply omissions
inadvertence, may be included within
1
transcends the judicial function.
First-year civil procedure teaches us that there are two paths a
plaintiff may choose if she wants to file suit in federal court. One path
requires the plaintiff to establish a cause of action based on federal law. 2
If, however, no federal cause of action exists, the alternate path requires
the plaintiff to satisfy the two elements of a diversity action. 3 First, there
1 Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1926) (Brandeis, J.) (citation omitted).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). Section 1331 of Title 28 reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Id.; see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (stating
that to invoke federal question jurisdiction, the cause of action must arise under federal
law and it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant will raise a defense
that is a matter of federal law); Blair v. Source One Mortgage Servs. Corp., 925 F. Supp.
617, 620 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that in a claim asserting federal question jurisdiction,
the federal cause of action must appear on the face of a claim).
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994), amended by Act of Oct. 19, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332). Section
1332 of Title 28 reads:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different states;
(2) citizens of a State, and citizens and subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of a different State and in which foreign states of citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff
and citizens of a State or of different States.
For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted to
the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which
such alien is domiciled.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute
of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the
Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the
2
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must be diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the defendant.4
That is, the plaintiff may not be domiciled in the same state as the defendant. 5 Second, the plaintiffs claim must exceed a statutorily mandated

amount, commonly called the amount in controversy.' Congress adjusts
the amount in controversy virtually always upwards, from time to time,
and it is currently set at greater than $75,000.'

Diversity actions quite often involve many plaintiffs who have
joined together either for convenience or as plaintiffs in a class action.
As applied to multiple plaintiffs joining together for the sake of conven-

ience, the application of the two elements of a diversity actioncitizenship and amount in controversy-had been clearly established for

many years: each plaintiff had to satisfy the citizenship requirement8 and
the amount in controversy requirement.' In an attempt to codify this
common law, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1367.0 Rarely has a statute
sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff
and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.
(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title(1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by
which it has been incorporated and the State where it has its principal place of business, except that in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as
a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the
State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State
where it has its principle place of business; and
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be
deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent, and
the legal representative of an infant or incompetent shall be a citizen
only of the same State as the infant or incompetent.
(d) The word "States", as used in this section, includes the Territories, the
District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Id.
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (holding that in cases
brought under the diversity statute, there must be complete diversity between all plaintiffs
and all defendants).
4 See Strawbridge, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 267.
5 See id.
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also supra note 3 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332).
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also supra note 3 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332).
8 See Strawbridge, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 267.
9 See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (declaring that each plaintiff must satisfy the statutory amount in controversy).
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts
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seemingly so innocuous proved so volatile." Errors in the drafting of the
statute allow diversity jurisdiction to reach much farther than intended,
and reshape the jurisdictional landscape in dramatic fashion. The statute
relieves all but the main plaintiff joined in a diversity action for convenience from satisfying either of the requirements of a diversity action. 2
Because of this statute, additional plaintiffs may now join without regard
to their citizenship or the size of their claims. 3
The statute also sought to codify the common law regarding the
joinder of plaintiffs in diversity class actions. Here, the elements of a diversity action were traditionally applied differently. For a quarter century, federal subject matter jurisdiction over a diversity class action 4 had
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not
have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be
joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim under subsection (a) if-(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction.
Id.
H See Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to
Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 213 n.2 (1991) (noting the congressional intent to codify the less controversial recommendations made by the Federal
Courts Study Committee).
12 See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367).
14 See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 249 (6th ed. 1990). "A 'class' within rule relating
to class action must be taken in broad colloquial sense of group of people ranked together
as having common characteristics, and the function of the enumerated requirements of
rule is to assure that from those characteristics there arises a common legal position vis-kvis the opposing party, the legal right or obligations of which the court can efficiently and
fairly adjudicate in a single proceeding." Id.
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been governed by the following rule: only the named plaintiff must meet
the diversity of citizenship requirement,"s but all class members must

meet the amount in controversy requirement.16 Section 1367 of title 28
See generally THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACTIONS: THE LAW OF 50 STATES § 1.01
(1988) (summarizing the basic elements and use of a class action).
Class actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,
or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
15 See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (stating that in
a diversity class action only the named plaintiff must satisfy the citizenship requirement).
16 See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). Subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts over class actions developed primarily through three United
States Supreme Court cases. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 293; Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969); Supreme Tribe, 255 U.S. at 367. In Supreme Tribe, the Court held that in diversity class actions only the named plaintiff need be of diverse citizenship from the defendant. See 255 U.S. at 367. Snyder added that in diversity class actions when no plaintiff
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overrules this basic tenet of diversity class actions by allowing unnamed
class members who cannot meet the amount in controversy to invoke
supplemental jurisdiction and remain part of the class.17
These changes may not seem monumental, but they wiped out,
without warning, basic rules of civil procedure that operated for many
years.
After the enactment of § 1367, discussion of the statute
abounded,"8 and while the statute is very effective in many respects, 9
meets the amount in controversy, plaintiffs may not aggregate their claims to satisfy the
amount in controversy. See 394 U.S. at 338. The result was that if a group of plaintiffs
wished to file a diversity class action in federal court only the named plaintiff had to be
diverse from the defendant, but all members of the class had to satisfy the amount in
controversy. See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338; Supreme Tribe, 255 U.S. at 367. When Zahn
was decided, all class actions fell under its rule, because there was an amount in controversy requirement for claims made both under federal law and the diversity statute. See
Zahn, 414 U.S. at 293. Currently, this amount in controversy requirement remains in
effect only for claims asserted under the diversity statute. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1996) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996).
17 See infra note 231 (for a list of diversity class actions successfully removed to federal court even though class members failed to meet the amount in controversy).
1s See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Debate over § 1367.: Defining the
Power to Define Federal JudicialPower, 41 EMORY L.J. 13 (1992) (questioning the importance of diversity cases, examining the power of courts to define supplemental jurisdiction in situations not provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and noting extrinsic sources
the Supreme Court could consider when interpreting the new statute); Laura L. Hirschfeld, The $50,000 Question: Does Supplemental Jurisdiction Extend to Claims Between
Diverse Parties Which Do Not Meet § 1332's Amount-in-Controversy Requirement?, 68
TEMP. L. REv. 107 (1995) (examining the history of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,
the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and recommended amendments of the statute); Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental JurisdictionStatute-A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 849 (1992) (examining 28 U.S.C. § 1367
in relation to Article III and also examining the effect of the statute itself); Karen Nelson
Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An Important But Controversial Supplement to FederalJurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31 (1992) (analyzing ambiguities of subsection (b) and offering suggestions for Congress to use in restructuring supplemental jurisdiction in diversity actions); Wendy Collins Perdue, The New Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute-Flawed But Fixable, 41 EMORY L.J. 69 (1992) (examining subsection (b) and
offering a proposed statute); Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdiction in § 1441 Removed Cases: An Unsurveyed Frontierof Congress' Handiwork, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 305
(1993) (specifically analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 1367's effect on cases removed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441 in relation to plaintiffs' claims against persons joined under Rules 14, 19,
20, and 24); Timothy E. Congrove, Comment, A Look at Supplemental Jurisdiction Following Its Codification, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 499 (1992) (reviewing the case law in the
wake of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, examining unanswered questions, and possible solutions);
Elizabeth Delagardelle, Defining the Parameters of Supplemental Jurisdiction After 28
U.S. C. § 1367, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 391 (1994) (examining the history of supplemental jurisdiction and the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 on several district court cases); Darren J.
Gold, Note, Supplemental Jurisdictionover Claims by Plaintiffs in Diversity Cases: Making Sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), 93 MIcHI. L. REv. 2133 (1995) (examining the legislative history and language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) and offering a uniform test to determine
the circumstances under which subsection (b) permits the use of supplemental jurisdiction); Kristen M. Niemi, Note, The "Noncontroversial" Statute. Have Expressed Con-
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there are numerous instances where the statute's language does not comport with the purported congressional intent.'
cerns of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 Come to Light?, 72 U. DET. MERcY L. REv. 397 (1995)
(concluding that by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 Congress correctly addressed the problem
that called for the statute in the first place); Shay S. Scott, Comment, Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 72 OR. L. REv. 695 (1993) (examining the history of
supplemental jurisdiction and the statute, concluding that while the statute has problems, it
is not a complete debacle); Jason C.N. Smith, Comment, Update On Changes in Federal
Jurisdiction:Supplemental Jurisdiction, Venue, and Removal, 23 TEx. TECH L. REV. 571
(1992) (examining the effects of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 on federal jurisdiction).
19 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction,40 EMORY
L.J. 993, 994-96 (1991). The main and immediate purpose of the statute was to overrule
the holding of Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), which subsection (a) clearly
does. See id. at 994. Subsection (a) also codified United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, by employing the "common nucleus of operative fact" test. See 383 U.S. at 725. Considering
that the majority of cases brought in federal court involve a federal question and are
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the statute clearly and correctly does authorize supplemental jurisdiction in a majority of cases. See Rowe Jr. et al., supra, at 994.
In relation to cases brought under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is also very
effective. See id. at 995. Subsection (b) codifies the rationale of Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), and prohibits the availability of supplemental jurisdiction for certain claims when doing so would allow the circumvention of the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Rowe, supra, at 995. Rowe, Burbank, and
Mengler (hereinafter "the drafters" of the statute) make the point that subsection (b) answers the majority of issues regarding supplemental jurisdiction in cases based on the diversity statute. See id.
20 See generally Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445
(1991). There are problems with the statute that deserve mention if only to put in context
how many issues the statute leaves open. Problems with the statute that are not the focus
of this Comment include the alienage oversight. See id. at 474-75. This problem is
based on subsection (b)'s prohibition of a variety of claims when the case is based on 28
U.S.C. § 1332. See id. What Congress most likely intended, however, was to prohibit
such claims when based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)--the diversity statute. See id. at 475.
By simply stating 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Section prohibits the enumerated claims in cases
based on any part of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, including alienage jurisdiction, which comes under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). See id. Section 1332(a)(2) of Title 28 allows for a federal
forum for cases between a citizen of a state and a citizen of a foreign country. See id.
This is one of the areas of diversity jurisdiction that is still heavily supported, and not one
that people believe should be curtailed in the same way as a regular diversity action. See
id.
Another problem with subsection (b) is the Rule 19/24 anomaly. See id. at 476-78.
Prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a claim by a party deemed indispensable under Rule 19 was not eligible for supplemental jurisdiction if doing so would destroy diversity. See id. at 476-77. So, if a party is deemed necessary and indispensable under
Rule 19 but cannot be joined because so doing would destroy diversity, the plaintiff risks
a dismissal. See id.at 477. If the same party in the same proposition wishes to intervene
under Rule 24, however, supplemental jurisdiction was thought to apply. See id. Here is
the anomaly: the same party may join the action under one Rule, but not the other. See
id.
The effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is to remove this anomaly and replace it with another
one. See id. A plain language reading of subsection (b) clearly precludes claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 and by parties who wish to inter-
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Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the common law
that Congress sought to codify, and sets out the problems with the resulting statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Parts II and III examine the only appellate court interpretation regarding the omissions of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"), which governs class actions, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 ("Rule 20"), which governs permissive
joinder of plaintiffs, from 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Part IV examines the approach courts should take in interpreting the statute and offers suggestions for revision of subsection (b) of the statute. Finally, Part V deals
with the practical effects of the statute regarding removal and the danger
of a court raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.2 '
I.

THE COMMON LAW AND THE STATUTE

The History of Supplemental Jurisdiction
A strict application of the diversity and federal question requirements occasionally called for inequitable and uneconomic results. To
minimize this, federal courts developed a common-law doctrine that alA.

vene as plaintiffs under Rule 24. See id. The statute, however, makes no mention of defendant intervenors. See id. at 477-78. Thus, many feel the anomaly has not been fixed
but has simply been replaced with a new one. See id. at 477.
Another problem is the different treatment of "upsloping" and "downsloping"
claims brought under Rule 14. See id. at 448 & n.20. "Upsloping" refers to claims asserted by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant that has been impleaded. See id.
"Downsloping" refers to claims by a third-party defendant against the plaintiff. See id.
"Upsloping" claims are precluded by the statute, but "downsloping" claims are not. See
id. In light of Owen, this is a successful codification of the Court's rationale. See id. at
476. Freer simply does not like Owen and makes a point of noting it, calling this treatment of the claims "schizophrenic." See id. He also states that the different treatment
"upsloping" and "downsloping" claims receive under the statute is based on a bias
against diversity. See id.
But see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About
Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943 (1991). As
for the alienage problem, the drafters note that prior to the statute the complete diversity
rule in regard to alienage cases was a "dysfunctional crazy quilt of results." See id.at
954 (footnote omitted). Adopting a minimal diversity rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 would
have been impossible because it was passed in the last days of Congress and such a proposal would have undoubtedly thwarted passage of the statute. See id. at 951-52. Section
1367 of Title 28 does adopt a minimal diversity requirement, however, and was not delayed by Congress at all. It seems no one noticed just what the statute actually accomplished in this regard.
As to the Rule 19/24 anomaly, the drafters state that their words codify the rationale
of Owen. See id.at 955-57. That was their aim, not an attempt to abolish diversity. See
id. at 956.
21 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary defines sua sponte as: "[o]f his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or
suggestion." Id.

1504

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:1497

lowed federal courts to hear claims without an independent basis for jurisdiction.' For example, if a plaintiff alleges two claims, one federal
and one state, arising from the same occurrence against the same defen-

dant, subject matter jurisdiction would preclude a federal court from
hearing the state claim along with the federal claim, unless the plaintiff
was able to establish the elements of a diversity action for the state
claim.' The plaintiff would thus have two options. First, the plaintiff
could bring an action in state court for both claims, thus denying herself
a federal forum for the federal claim.' Second, the plaintiff could bring

two lawsuits: one in federal court for the federal claim and one in state
court for the state claim.
To address this problem, courts developed the doctrine of "pendent
jurisdiction."' In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs' the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in federal court on a federal question
could assert a state law claim against the defendant, provided that the

claim passed the Court's two-part transactional test.27 The test required
that (1) both claims arise from a "common-nucleus of operative fact" and
(2) one would expect the two claims to be tried together.2'
Another problem that caused the courts to intervene occurred when,

in a diversity action, the defendant wanted to join a party from the same
state as the plaintiff as a third-party defendant.

9

This joinder would de-

stroy complete diversity because a plaintiff and a defendant would be
domiciliaries of the same state.3
In this instance, courts developed
"ancillary jurisdiction," which allowed courts to hear claims by parties
whose joinder would destroy complete diversity. 3 Ancillary jurisdiction,

22 See Witchita R.R. & Light v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922)
(allowing intervention of a nondiverse party who is not indispensable for proper adjudication); Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1886) (same); Freeman v. Howe, 24 U.S.
(1 How.) 450, 460 (1860) (allowing for intervention without regard to citizenship).
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also supra note 2 (for the relevant
text of 28 U.S.C. § 1331); supra note 3 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. § 1332).
2A For the most part, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over
federal claims, but Congress has designated some claims as exclusively federal. See
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45, at 287 (5th ed. 1994)
25 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (6th ed. 1990). Pendant jurisdiction is defined
as: "[a] principle applied in federal courts that allows state created causes of action arising out of the same transaction to be joined with a federal cause of action even if diversity
of citizenship is not present." Id.
' 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
27 See id. at 725.
2 See id.
29 See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 367-69 (1978).
30 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
31 See Owen, 437 U.S. at 377.
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however, did not extend to claims asserted by the plaintiff against such a
defendant.32
In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,33 a diversity action,
the defendant joined as a third-party defendant' a party not diverse from
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff attempted to assert a claim against this nondiverse, third-party defendant. 5 Even though the plaintiff's claim against
the non-diverse third-party defendant arose out a "common nucleus of
operative fact," the United States Supreme Court explained that the
Gibbs transactional test was not the end of the analysis. 36 Additionally,
the Court held, federal courts must examine the posture of the party asserting the claim and the statute that conferred jurisdiction over the
claim. 37 Thus, the Court disallowed the claim by the plaintiff against the
non-diverse, third-party defendant because the claim would frustrate the
diversity of citizenship requirement.38
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only when Congress
and the Constitution provide for it explicitly. 39 There can be no implied
32

See id.

3' 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
34 See FED. R. Civ. P. 14. Rule 14(a) states in pertinent part:

At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the thirdparty plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party
plaintiff.
35 See Owen, 437 U.S. at 367-69.
36 See id. at 373.
37 See id. Thus, the Owen Court found it inconsistent with the diversity statute to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim against a non-diverse party impleaded by the defendant.
See id. at 377.
38 See id. at 374.
39 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This Section states in pertinent part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;- between
a State and a Citizen of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.; see also Freer, supra note 20, at 453.
After Gibbs many people thought supplemental jurisdiction was a type of "common
law subject matter jurisdiction." See Freer, supra note 20, at 453. The lack of a statute
could mean only two things. See id. Either there was a statutory basis and the courts had
not announced it, or the courts had been incorrectly exercising supplemental jurisdiction
for over a hundred years. See id. "Mhe latter conclusion was to be avoided if possible." Id. Courts are particularly careful when dealing with constitutional issues, espe-
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subject matter jurisdiction, which is essentially what ancillary and pendent jurisdiction allowed.' Eventually, when the United States Supreme
Court faced this issue in Finley v. United States, the Court called into
question the validity of all types of supplemental jurisdiction.4 1 In Finley,
the plaintiff's husband and two children were killed when their plane

crashed into electrical wires outside a San Diego airfield.42 The plaintiff
brought suit in federal court against the Federal Aviation Administration
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),43 and the district court
allowed the plaintiff to join a state law tort claim with the federal claim
against the San Diego Gas and Electric Company." The district court
asserted pendent party jurisdiction under Gibbs,' but the United States

cially when faced with the possibility that federal courts have been invalidly exercising
power for many years. See id. n.53. It has happened, however. See id. (citing Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
40 See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). In Aldinger the Court held that
the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction could not support a state law claim if the jurisdiction-invoking claim is a federal statute that expressly or impliedly removes the defendant from the grasp of the federal statute. See id. Furthermore, in Aldinger the Court
held that jurisdiction over such supplemental claims was implied unless specifically negated by Congress. See id.
See also Freer, supra note 20, at 454 (discussing that in both Aldinger and Owen,
the Court found supplemental jurisdiction authorized as long as it was not specifically
precluded by Congress).
4' 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
42 See id. at 546.
'3

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1996).
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

Id.
See Finley, 490 U.S. at 546-47. Initially the plaintiff brought a tort claim in state
court against the San Diego Gas and Electric Company, who was responsible for the illuminations and positioning of the power lines. See id. at 546. After discovering that the
Federal Aviation Administration was responsible for the runway lights, the plaintiff filed
an action in federal court, basing jurisdiction on the Federal Tort Claims Act. See id.
Later the plaintiff amended her complaint and added the San Diego Gas and Electric
Company. See id. There was no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the claim
against San Diego Gas and Electric Company. See id. The district court allowed this,
asserting "pendent jurisdiction," pursuant to Gibbs. See id. at 546-47.
45 See supra Part I for an explanation of pendant party jurisdiction.
4
See Finley, 490 U.S. at 546-47.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 7 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, finding no statutory grant of federal court
jurisdiction over the state law claim."
In Finley, the Court stated that federal courts require a statutory
grant to exercise jurisdiction, and supplemental jurisdiction lacked such a
grant.4 9 Writing for the majority,' Justice Scalia noted that "it remains
rudimentary law" that a federal court requires two things to find subject
matter jurisdiction: the Constitution must allow for it, and Congress must
grant it.51 The Court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claim even though a plaintiff is required to bring a claim
under the FTCA in federal court.52 By refusing to hear the state law
claim, the Court forced the plaintiff to bring two separate lawsuits. In
addition, by finding no statutory authority for supplemental jurisdiction
in general, the majority's analysis called into question all forms of sup-

plemental jurisdiction, not merely the type rejected in Finley.53
The need for a statute became apparent, and urgent. Because supplemental jurisdiction was considered desirable, and perhaps, too, be-

cause courts had been using supplemental jurisdiction for over a hundred
years, Congress acted swiftly to undo Finley by passing section 1367. 54

41 See id. at 547
48 See id. at 556.
49 See id. at 548-49.
50 See id. at 546. Finley was decided by a narrow margin of five to four. See id.
51 See Finley, 490 U.S. at 548.
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also supra note 43 (for the relevant text of 28

U.S.C. § 1346).
53 See Freer, supra note 20, at 446. There has been some debate on how destructive
the decision of Finley was to the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction and whether a statute as complex as 28 U.S.C. § 1367 was needed at all. See id. There was reason to believe that the lower courts would have read Finley very narrowly, and that Finley was not
as destructive as first thought. See id. The statute should have merely overruled Finley
and should not have become a complex, anti-diversity statute. See id.; see also Thomas
C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws. The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 990 (1991) (suggesting the notion that
Congress could have written a very narrow statute that simply overruled Finley by allowing pendent state claims even when the claim establishing original jurisdiction was one
over which the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction).
But see Rowe, supra note 19, at 945-48 (stating that there was an immediate need for
a statutory grant for supplemental jurisdiction, and that Finley had left federal courts in a
state of confusion and conflict concerning supplemental jurisdiction).
5
See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Abdication to Academia: The Case of the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 157
(1994) (tracking the statute through the legislative process).
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The Problems with the Statute

Section 1367 of title 28 eliminates the terms "pendent"

and

"ancillary" jurisdiction and refers to both as "supplemental jurisdic-

tion."" 5 Subsection (a) of the statute grants federal courts supplemental
jurisdiction over claims without an independent basis for jurisdiction
arising out of the "same case or controversy" as a claim within the federal court jurisdiction.56 Subsection (a)'s grant of jurisdiction, however,
is subject to the limitations in subsections (b) and (c). 57

Subsection (c) applies to suits founded on either federal question or
diversity jurisdiction. 5 This subsection grants the court discretion to de-

cline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in a number of circumstances.59 For example, if the claim that invokes the original subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal court is dismissed, the court may decline
to hear the supplemental claim.'

The main problems with the statute arise in subsection (b). Subsection (b) severely limits the availability of supplemental jurisdiction to
plaintiffs in suits founded solely on diversity.6' The subsection prohibits

supplemental jurisdiction "over claims by persons proposed to be joined
as plaintiffs under Rule 19 ...when exercising supplemental jurisdiction
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332. "62 To allow otherwise would make it easy for plaintiffs to circum-

vent the complete diversity rule.
Currently, the subsection reads:

5 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 cmt. (1990).
5
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1996); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28
U.S.C. § 1367).
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367).
m See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367).
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367). Subsection (c) permits the court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction if, inter alia, the claim that invoked the original jurisdiction of the court has been
dismissed or if the claim seeking to be heard under supplemental jurisdiction raises an
issue of state law more appropriately heard at the state level. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
6D See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367). This occurs when federal and state law claims are joined, and the court dismisses the federal claim; because there is no independent jurisdiction for the state law
claim, the court may dismiss this claim.
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367).
62 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367). Subsection (b) also prohibits plaintiffs from asserting claims against parties joined
under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
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In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts
shall not have supplemental jurisdiction.., over claims by persons
proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such
rules... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332. 63

"Rule 19" refers to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which governs the joinder of parties deemed absolutely necessary for proper adjudi-

cation.'

Once the court determines a party to be necessary, failure to

join this party may result in dismissal of the suit.' If the legislative history and the rationale behind the statute is accepted, subsection (b) should
also exclude supplemental jurisdiction claims by parties proposed to be

63 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367).
6 See FED R. Civ. P. 19. Rule 19 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Persons to Be Joined If Feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1)
in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not
been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If
the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the
joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the
venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as
described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties;
second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will
be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if
the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. ...
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 23.
65 See Temple v. Synthes Corp., 111 S. Ct. 315 (1990) (refusing to grant dismissal on
the grounds that a joint tortfeasor was required for proper adjudication, and that that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 does not require that all joint tortfeasors be joined in a
single lawsuit).
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joined ,under Rules 20 and 23.' "Rule 20" refers to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 20, which governs the joinder of parties simply for the
sake of convenience of the parties.67 "Rule 23" refers to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, which governs the joinder of parties in class actions.'

In regard to class actions, Congress supposedly attempted to codify
the holding of Zahn v. InternationalPaper' where. the United States Supreme Court held that every.plaintiff, not merely the named plaintiff, in a
diversity class action must satisfy the amount in controversy. 0 Presumably to reinforce the idea that Zahn was to remain good law,7 1 courts often

mention the section of the legislative history that states "[this] section is
not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332
in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted
prior to Finley."' Another compelling source for courts comes from the

footnote to the quoted sentence that cites Zahn.73 At first glance, it seems
clear that Congress intended to include Rule 23 in the listed exceptions of
subsection (b). But, in an attempt to fix the "oversight," these mentions
6 See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N., 6860,
6875 & n.17.
67 See FED. R. CIv. P. 20. Rule 20 reads, in pertinent part:

(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as. plaintiffs if
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to
all these persons will arise in the action. All persons ... may be joined in
one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and
if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded.. Judgment may be given for one or
more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and
against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a
party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion
of a party against whom the party asserts no claim and who asserts no
claim against the party, and may order separate trials or make other orders
to prevent delay or prejudice.
6g See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see also supra note 14 (for the relevant text of Rule 23).
69 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875 & n.17 (specifically mentioning that the holding of Zahn remains
good law).
70 See 414 U.S. at 301.
71 See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875 &
n.17.
7' See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875.
' See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875 &
n.17.
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of Rule 23 were specifically written into the legislative history after Congress passed the statute. 74
Due to the omission of Rule 23, the statute clearly allows plaintiffs
joined, in a diversity class action to avail themselves of supplemental jurisdiction.75 This allows unnamed class members, whose claims do not
meet the amount in controversy, into federal court on the. claim of a
named plaintiff whose claim satisfies the amount.76 This problem will be
discussed in Part II.
The statute also precludes the joinder of a plaintiff deemed necessary and indispensable for proper adjudication pursuant to Rule 19 if doing so would destroy diversity. The statute however, contains no mention of plaintiffs joined strictly for the sake of convenience under Rule
20.' The result is that a non-diverse, indispensable plaintiff may not invoke supplemental jurisdiction, yet a non-diverse plaintiff joined strictly
for the sake of convenience may utilize supplemental jurisdiction. 7
Thus, the maxim-regarding complete diversity' is easily circumvented by
Rule 20 plaintiffs. The statute does not accomplish what Congress supposedly wanted: to codify the rationale and concerns of Owen Equipment
& Erection Co. v. Kroger where the United States Supreme Court held

that a plaintiff may not use supplemental jurisdiction to avoid the complete diversity requirement.'
cussed in Part III.

This problem with the statute will be dis-

74 See Rowe, supra note 19, at 960 n.90.

' See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1996); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28
U.S.C. § 1367).
76 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§
1367).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; FED. R. CIV. P. 20; see also supra note 67 (for the text of
Rule 20).
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367).
79 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
8D 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted
in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875 & n.16 (mentioning Owen and stating the congressional intent to preclude someone from avoiding the diversity requirements by filing suit and later
joining the non-diverse party); Freer, supra note 20, at 459 & n.82 (asserting that a statute was already in place to protect against a plaintiff acting to avoid the diversity requirements and that although it would not have been effective in Owen, 28 U.S.C. § 1359
protects against the collusive joinder of parties). Section 1359 of Title 28 states:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any
party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1996).
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II. THE RULE 23 OMISSION: 28 U.S.C. § 1367's EFFECT ON DIVERSITY
CLASS ACTIONS

A.

The Fifth Circuit Faces Section 1367(b) and the Rule 23
Omission

Thus far, only one appellate court has dealt squarely with the Rule
23 omission. In In re Abbott Laboratories, the Fifth Circuit took little
time dispensing with the holding of Zahn."1 In Zahn the United States
Supreme Court required all plaintiffs in a diversity class action to meet

the amount in controversy.'

By interpreting the statute in a way that ab-

rogated Zahn, the Abbott court removed a cornerstone of diversity class
actions, and redefined the power of federal courts."
Abbott began as a class action filed in Louisiana state court by
named plaintiffs Robin and Renee Free, against Abbott Laboratories,
Bristol-Meyers Squibb Company, and Mead Johnson and Johnson." The

plaintiffs claimed that the defendants entered into an agreement to artificially raise the price of infant formula."

The plaintiffs requested dam-

ages not to exceed $20,000 per plaintiff.' The plaintiffs alleged no federal antitrust infringement, and based the entire suit on Louisiana state
law. 7 A Louisiana statute allowed the defendants to attribute the recovery of all attorney fees to the named plaintiffs only, 8 thus increasing the

named plaintiffs' claims to over $50,000 each."
Thus, the defendants removed the entire case to federal court: the
named plaintiffs' claims on the basis of diversity jurisdiction' and the

s' 51 F.3d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1995).
See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
See Abbott, 51 F.3d at 525.
84 See id.
" See id.
6 See id. at 526.
87 See id. at 525.
88 See LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 595 (West 1996).
The court may allow the representative parties their reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees, when as a result of the class action a fund is made available, or a recovery or compromise is had which is beneficial, to the class.
The court, on contradictory motion at any stage of the proceeding in the trial court
prior to judgment, may require the plaintiff in a class action to furnish security for the
court costs which a defendant may be compelled to pay. This security for costs may be
increased or decreased by the court, on contradictory motion of any interested party, on a
showing that the security furnished has become inadequate or excessive. See id.
89 See Abbott, 51 F.3d at 526-27.
90 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). At the time Abbott was decided, the amount in controversy requirement was $50,000. Currently, the amount is set at $75,000. See id.
82
83
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unnamed class members' claims based on supplemental jurisdiction.91
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand,' and the defendants appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.' The appellate
court reversed and allowed the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
the unnamed plaintiffs' claims that did not meet the amount in controversy.'
The appellate court began by analyzing the Louisiana statute and
held that it allowed for the attribution of attorney fees to the named
plaintiffs.95 The court found that this raised their claims to over $50,000
each, thus satisfying the amount in controversy and giving the federal
court jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1).' Next, the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 abrogated Zahn
and that the district court erred by remanding the case. 97 The court began
the analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 by acknowledging that the legislative
history appears to support the position that Congress intended to leave
Zahn intact. 98 The court stated, however, that absent ambiguous or unclear statutory language, the court could not examine the legislative history.' The court needed a mere four sentences to identify 28 U.S.C. §
1367 as neither." °
The court next stated that if the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, that language is the "sole repository of congressional in-

91

See Abbott, 51 F.3d at 525.

See id.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 528.
95 See id. at 526-27.
96 See Abbott, 51 F.3d at 527.
g7 See id. at 529.
" See id.at 528.
9 See id.
100 See id.The court stated:
We cannot search legislative history for congressional intent unless we find
the statute unclear or ambiguous. Here, it is neither. The statute's first
section vests federal courts with the power to hear supplemental claims
generally, subject to limited exceptions set forth in the statute's second
section. Class actions are not among the enumerated exceptions.
Id. But see Borgeson v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 909 F. Supp. 709, 716 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (agreeing with Abbott that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is unambiguous, but disagreeing as to
what the statute actually means); see also infra notes 109-117 and accompanying text; cf
Waters v. Grosfeld, 904 F. Supp. 616, 620 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that the language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is not unclear and therefore use of legislative history is appropriate);
Snider v. Stimson Lumber Co., 914 F. Supp. 388, 390-91 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (same); see
also infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
92
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tent" 1 ' and the statutory language controls unless the language calls for
an absurd result. 2 The court enunciated that its role was not to examine
the wisdom of the statute, but merely to determine if overruling Zahn
was absurd." 2 Citing the Brennan dissent in Zahn and several, scholars

who would support abrogating Zahn, the court reasoned it was not an absurd result."°4 Once the court found that it was not absurd to overrule
Zahn, it simply took a reading of the statute to do so.15
See Abbott, 51 F.3d at 529.
See id. (citing West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100
(1991) (holding that the "plain language" of a statute cannot be overtaken by a Courtimposed concept of public policy); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
464, 467-68 (1994) (refusing to allow a "plain language reading" of a statute where it
would call for an absurd result)).
103 See id.
104 See id. (citing Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close Enough for Government Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007,
1008 n.6).
In Zahn, the dissent mentioned three factors that control the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. See Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 305 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The factors are: the effect of litigation on third parties; the feasibility of all
the disputes being resolved in an individual adjudication; and how the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure control the structure of the case. See id. Justice Brennan declared that
after considering these factors, the Court had in prior cases upheld the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in relation to compulsory counterclaims, and intervention as of right. See
id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S.
348, 350 (1961); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926)). The
dissent also noted that courts of appeals followed the Supreme Court's lead and had allowed ancillary jurisdiction over cross-claims. See id. (citing R.M. Smythe & Co. v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 291 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cit. 1961); Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798,
805 (5th Cir. 1957)). The dissent also noted that such jurisdiction was permitted over
interpleaded defendants. See id. (citing Walmac Co., Inc. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 111
(1st Cir. 1955)). Additionally, courts allowed ancillary jurisdiction over impleaded defendants. See id. (citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843,
845 (3d Cir. 1962)).
Next, the dissent asserted that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is appropriate for
class actions. See id. First and foremost, the dissent mentioned that ample protections
exist within Rule 23(b)(3) to assure that the class action is not used to gain a federal forum over unrelated claims of non-diverse plaintiffs. See id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Justice stressed that the pragmatic considerations justifying the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction over counter-claims are certainly as strong in regard to class actions.
See id. Stating that class actions were created to address a need, the dissent pointed out
the alternatives: joinder of all possible class members or redundant litigation. See id.
Both of these, the dissent concluded, would be too costly and would consume too much of
the judiciary's resources. See id.
Justice Brennan next pointed to the Court's holding in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble. See id. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 255 U.S. 356 (1921)). In that
case, the Court required only the named plaintiff in a diversity class action to meet the
diversity of citizenship requirement. See Supreme Tribe, 255 U.S. at 367. The holding
in Supreme Tribe carved out an exception to the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss. See id. (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) 267, 267
(1806)). Justice Brennan questioned why, in light of Supreme Tribe, all class members
101
102
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B.

The Aftermath of Abbott
Abbott has done little to guide the district courts, or to offer a persuasive interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in relation to class actions.
Federal courts' interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 regarding the Rule
23 omission are as diverse in the wake of Abbott as they were prior to
it." ° Some courts simply adopt Abbott's analysis; 7 other courts, however, avoid this result." s
In Borgeson v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 1 9 the United States
District Court for the Central District of California rejected the holding
of the Fifth Circuit in Abbott.' The court cited the legislative history of
28 U.S.C. § 1367 as support for the argument that Zahn survives.' Unfortunately, the court never stated what unclear language in the statute
justified reference to the legislative history."' Perhaps the court did so
merely as a prelude to its next point: a plain language reading of the statute shows that Zahn survives." 3

should be required to meet the amount in controversy. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 309
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
The argument is a compelling one. If class actions are important enough to warrant
an exception to the rule of Strawbridge in relation to the citizenship of unnamed class
members, it is inconsistent to hold that they must meet the amount in controversy. The
claims of unnamed class members are either important enough for special considerations,
or they are not. On this point, the errors in the drafting of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ironically
codify the dissent in Zahn, not the majority. A plain reading of the statute allows for
supplemental jurisdiction over unnamed class members regardless of citizenship or the
amount in controversy.
A point discussed in the Zahn dissent, and implicit in Abbott is that plaintiffs in a
class action enjoy a unique position. They are treated differently because of the holding
in Supreme Tribe, and an entire lengthy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is dedicated to
the proper formation of a "class." See FED. R. CIv. P. 23; see also note 14 (for the
relevant text of Rule 23). As Justice Brennan pointed out, there are numerous hurdles a
group of plaintiffs must overcome to achieve class certification. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at
306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'05 See Abbott, 51 F.3d at 528.
'o6 See, e.g., Aspe Arquitectos, S.A. de C.V. v. Jamieson, 869 F. Supp. 593, 595
(N.D. I11.1994) (holding that Zahn is not overruled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367); Dirosa v.
Grass, No. 94-2551, 1994 WL 583276, at *2, (E.D. La. Oct., 19 1994) (same).
107 See, e.g., Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928,
931 (7th Cir. 1996); Gilmer v. Walt Disney Co., 915 F. Supp. 1001, 1010 (W.D. Ark.
1996); Booty v. Shoney's, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1524, 1527 (E.D. La. 1995).
log See infra notes 109-122, 244 and accompanying text for cases that avoid applying
the statute as written.
109 909 F. Supp. 709 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
"o See id. at 715-16.
"'. See id. at 715.
112
13

See id.
See id. at 716.
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The "Borgesoncourt agreed with the holding of Abbott-that the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is clear-but the Borgeson court interpreted the words in a completely different manner. 4 Section 1367 of title 28 begins: " [e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute." "' The Borgeson court
held that the phrase "or as expressly provided otherwise by federal stat-

ute" restrains the power granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 due to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and its relevant interpretations in Zahn
and Snyder."' The result of this. interpretation is that all plaintiffs must

meet the amount in controversy requirement." 7
Recently, in Snider v. Stimson Lumber Co.,"8 the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California raised an interesting,
and much more persuasive, rebuttal to the holding of Abbott." 9 Specifically, the Snider court noted that a class action is a procedural device,
not something that combines all claimants' rights under a single case or
controversy'as required by 28 U.S:C. § 1367(a).' 2' Under the Snider

analysis, there are as many cases or controversies as there are members
in the class, and because each member has her own case, she must inde-

pendently meet the amount in controversy.'' The Snider court also noted
that even if one reads 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as the Fifth Circuit did, because

the statute may also be interpreted as consistent with Zahn, the language
of the statute is far from clear." =

114 See Borgeson, 909 F. Supp. at 716.

"s 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1996); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant
text of 28
U.S.C. § 1367).
116 See Borgeson, 909 F. Supp. at 716 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
117 There is, however, a major flaw in this argument. If Congress simply meant for 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) to be subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the interpretations of it, there
would be no need for subsection (b); Congress could have simply let the wording of subsection (a) incorporate the restrictions of diversity actions. But, subsection (b) deals specifically with limitations of a diversity action and how its use as a basis for jurisdiction
affects the power granted by subsection (a). If the court in Borgeson discussed subsection
(b), it would have found no mention of Rule 23, and consequently no basis to exclude
supplemental jurisdiction to unnamed class members whose claims fell below the jurisdictional amount. Instead, the court simply uses the phrase "or as expressly provided otherwise by federal statute" to bring 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the holding of Zahn into the
analysis. It seems obvious that the word "otherwise" in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is meant for
28 U.S.C. § 1332 to be incorporated only in those instances listed, while other statutes
not mentioned are to be fully utilized.
"s 914 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
"9 See id. at 390.
' See id. at 390-91.
121 See id. at 392.
'22 See id. at 391.
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Although a plain reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 seems to warrant the
holding in Abbott, the court in Snider presented an analysis that produces
an alternate result, which reconciles plain reading of the statute and the
holding of Zahn.1"
III. THE RULE 20

OMISSION AND §

1367's EFFECT ON MULTI-PLAINTIFF

ACTIONS

Plaintiffs in federal court join together in predominantly two
ways." If the reason for joinder is convenience, the parties must comply
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20." Alternatively, if the joinder
occurs because the court determines that a plaintiff is indispensable for
proper adjudication, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 governs the
.
joinder."
Prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the diversity requirements of diverse citizenship and amount in controversy applied identically to plaintiffs regardless of whether joinder occurred under Rule 19
or Rule 20.127 Section 1367 of title 28, however, altered these jurisdictional rules by changing the way a plaintiff is treated depending on how
she is joined. 24 Because the statute mentions parties joined under Rule
19 in the limitations of subsection (b), a court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims made by a necessary and indispensable
plaintiff." Presumably, however, supplemental jurisdiction is available
to plaintiffs joined strictly for the sake of convenience because no mention is made of parties joined under Rule 20."

See Rowe, supra note 19, at 960 n.90 (calling it a "delicious possibility" that Justice Scalia would either have to resort to legislative history or conclude that 28 U.S.C. §
1367 had overruled Zahn). But see Arthur & Freer, supra note 53, at 981 (asking if it is
really amusing that a Supreme Court decision is needed to resolve this issue).
124 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text for a discussion on permissive and
mandatory joinder under the Federal Rules.
125 See FED. R. CIv. P. 20; See also supra note 67 (for the text of Rule 20).
126 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19; see also supra note 64 (for the text of Rule 19).
127 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 19, 20; see also supra notes 64 and 67 (for the relevant text of
123

Rules 19 and
...See 28
1367).
'"
See 28
1367).
130 See 28
1367).

20).
U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
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The Seventh CircuitFaces 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) and the Rule 20'

A.

Omission

Thus far, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
is the only appellate court to deal directly with the omission of Rule 20
from 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) and to discuss the ramifications of this omission."' In Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., two

subcontractors under the same corporate control joined together to sue a
general contractor and the controlling individuals of that company for

breach of contract.' 32 Stromberg Metal Works (Stromberg) and Comfort
Control (Comfort) contracted with Press Mechanical (Press) to work on
the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning at the diesel generator
building of a power plant.133 When Press did not pay, Stromberg and
Comfort brought suit." Stromberg claimed damages of $425,000, well
above the jurisdictional amount, but Comfort only claimed $27,000, well

below the requisite amount. 135

131

See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.

1996).
132

See 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996). The facts of the case are slightly more compli-

cated and are worth noting for a complete understanding. Bechtel Power Corporation
(Bechtel) operated as the contracting agent for the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power station in
Maryland. See id. at 929. Bechtel contracted with Press Mechanical (Press) to work on
the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems of the diesel generator
building of the power station. See id. The contract between Press and Bechtel required
Press to bind subcontractors to the main contract when appropriate. See id. The contract
also contained a choice of law clause designating Maryland. See id. the Bechtel-Press
contract required Press certify that payments had been made to subcontractors before
Bechtel would pay Press. See id. at 930. Press, in turn, contracted with Stromberg
Metal Works (Stromberg) and Comfort Control (Comfort) to perform part of the HVAC
work as required by the contract between Press and Bechtel. See id. at 929. The purchase orders issued by Press stated that all work was to be done in compliance with the
specifications, plans, and other contract documents listed in the purchase order. See id.
the list included the master contract containing the Maryland choice of law clause. See
id. at 929-30. However, each purchase order issued by Press contained a choice of law
clause designating Illinois state law as controlling in any subsequent dispute between the
parties. See id. at 930.
Press certified to Bechtel that Stromberg had been paid $425,000 and that Comfort
had been paid $27,000 for work done pursuant to the subcontracts. See id. Press was
reimbursed by Bechtel. See id. Press became insolvent and made an assignment in favor
of its creditors. See id. In fact, Press had paid nothing to Comfort and had paid only
$18,000 to Stromberg. See id. Bechtel refused to pay the subcontractors directly because it had already paid Press. See id. Press could not pay them. See id. Stromberg
and Comfort filed suit against the three defendants in control of Press and who were responsible for the false representations of payment. See id.
,31 See id. at 929-30.
" See id. at 930.
135 See id.
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
dismissed Comfort's claim for lack of diversity jurisdiction because Comfort's claim did not meet the jurisdictional amount." The subcontractors
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
which reversed the dismissal." 7
In an opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook,"3 ' the court began its
discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 by noting that Stromberg's claim exceeded $50,000, but Comfort's did not.'39 The court stated that the first
inquiry was whether supplemental jurisdiction allowed the court to hear a
claim such as Comfort's." The court observed that in Clark v. Paul
Gray Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction did not reach a claim such as Comfort's. 4 ' The
Stromberg court, however, observed that the passage of 28 U.S.C. §
1367 may have affected the methodology of a Clark analysis.' 42 The
court acknowledged that most district courts hold that Zahn and Clark
retain their validity in the face of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.'43 But, citing Abbon, the court stated its reluctance to create a conflict among the circuit
courts on an issue of jurisdiction, especially where there is textual sup-

136 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., No. 94 C 6753, 1995
WL 387812 (N.D. I11.
1995), affd in part, vacated in part, remanded in part, 77 F.3d
928 (7th Cir. 1996).
137 See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 934.
138 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretationand the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984) (stating that the words of the statute have
the power to convey meaning and that power should establish what a statute means);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983)(denying that
all statutes apply to a question posed by litigants, and drawing a distinction between declaring a statute inapplicable and construing the statute); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text,
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61
(1993)(pointing out that legislative history is often slanted by the agenda of private individuals, and that one would have to be a detective to get to the true congressional intent
via such a process); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1987)(stating that the words of a statute are
the law, not what may appear in the legislative history); Frank H. Easterbrook, What
Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 441 (1990)(making the point
that there are many competing agendas at work during the drafting of a statute, so legislative history may not be an accurate indicator of congressional intent).
139 See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 930.
'40 See id.
141 See id. (citing Clark v. Paul Gray Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589
(1939)). In Clark, the
Court held that the diversity statute applies to each plaintiff individually and that each
plaintiff had to satisfy both the citizenship and amount in controversy requirements. See
Clark, 306 U.S. at 589.
142 See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 930.
143 See id.
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port in the statute for a finding that Zahn had been legislatively overruled.14
The court then reiterated its holding in Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 4 permitting a non-diverse pendent plaintiff whose
claim did not arise under a federal question to assert a claim under the
doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).14
The Stromberg court stated that if the statute permitted the claim in
Brazinski, certainly it would permit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Comfort's claim.1 7 The court observed that although 28
U.S.C. § 1367 was intended to overrule Finley, a case founded on a federal question, the presence of subsection (b) illustrates that the statute
governs actions founded on diversity as well.' 4" Acknowledging some
support from the legislative history that Zahn remains good law, the
Stromberg court held that the text of the statute is not limited by it. 49
The court declared that if the legislative history and the text of a statute
are at odds, the text controls." 5 Asserting that the ultimate message of
Zahn is that the class "device" is irrelevant on the issue of claim aggregation, the court refused the defendant's urging to distinguish Abbott
from the case at bar simply because it involved a class action. 5'
Next, the court discussed the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) on Zahn
and Clark.'52 From a pragmatic standpoint, the court noted that overruling Zahn allows thousands of small claims into federal court by way of
the class action, which would be a much greater burden on the federal
144

See id.

14

6 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 1993).
See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931 (citing Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1181)
See id. The court stated that:

146
147

§ 1367(a) permits the adjudication of a claim by a pendent party that neither arises under federal law nor is supported by diversity of citizenship.
If § 1367(a) allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who meets the jurisdictional
amount but not the diversity requirement, it also allows suit by a pendent
plaintiff who satisfies the diversity requirement but not the jurisdictional
amount.
See id.
'48 See id.
149 See id.
'iO See id. (citing In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1345 (7th Cir. 1989)). The clash
between the statute and the legislative history was particularly glaring in Sinclair. Section
302(c)(1) of Title 11 stated that conversion from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy to a Chapter 12
bankruptcy was not possible if the original filing took place before the effective date of
the Act. See Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1341. Yet a committee report clearly supported the
argument that conversion was intended to be possible under such circumstances. See id.
In an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, the court held that even in this instance, the language
of the statute controls. See id. at 1345.
151
See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931.
152 See id.
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courts than allowing a single pendent party as in the case at bar. 153 The
court reasoned that implicit in overruling Zahn is that Clark should also
be overturned because overturning Clark would be less burdensome on
the courts than overturning Zahn."
The court offered several examples of how subsection (b) is successful, while still protecting the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge. 155 As illustration, the court posited the following hypothetical: an
Illinois plaintiff sues an Indiana defendant and that defendant adds an Illinois third-party defendant. 56 The court noted that by allowing the claim
by the plaintiff against this new defendant, Strawbridge is no
longer ef57
fective law; subsection (b) however, prohibits such a result.1
The court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) permits Comfort's claims
as a permissively joined plaintiff.' The court mentioned that it made no
sense for the statute to disallow claims by non-diverse indispensable
plaintiffs, but to allow claims by non-diverse plaintiffs joined merely for
the sake of convenience.1 9 The court then observed the most devastating
effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b): the near destruction of the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge in certain circumstances." ° The court
noted that a plain reading of the statute shows that, if the suit can be in
federal court without any original jurisdiction problems, subsection (b)
allows claims made by a party joined under Rule 20, even if that party is
not diverse from the defendant, provided the non-diverse plaintiff's
claims are related closely enough to the main cause of action.' 6' In other
words, the way courts have understood 28 U.S.C. § 1332 for many years
has been altered by the problems with subsection (b).
The court, however, quickly qualified this jurisdictional bombshell. 62 The court noted that because the statute only applies to claims
that are part of the "same case or controversy," a court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction, finding that the cause of actions failed

13 See id.
"A'

See id.

'5 See id. at 932.
156 See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 932.

157 See id. The court offered a second example: an Indiana plaintiff sues an Illinois
defendant, purposely not joining a plaintiff that the initial plaintiff knows the defendant
will seek to have joined under Rule 19. See id. If this were allowed to occur, Strawbridge would be similarly decimated. See id.
'5' See id.
'59 See id.

"~' See id.

161 See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 932.
162 See id.
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the tests of Gibbs and Owen. 63 Alternatively, the court mentioned, if the
supplemental claim is one that dominates the main claim, a court may use
subsection (c)(2) to decline supplemental jurisdiction. 66 The facts of the
case here, however, led the court to conclude quickly that Stromberg's
and Comfort's claims were part of the same case, and that Comfort's
claim did not dominate Stromberg's. 65 The court set out the following
facts to support its conclusion: both companies were under the same control; the claims arose out of the same construction project; the defendant's fraudulent representations that harmed both plaintiffs was a single
course of action; and the same purchase orders were used. 66 The court
concluded that this case presented the same factual and legal issues and
that this was exactly the type of case for which supplemental jurisdiction
was intended.167
The Stromberg court's interpretation of subsection (b) extends the
rationale of Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble. 65 In Supreme Tribe,
the United States Supreme Court required only the named plaintiff in a
diversity class action to meet the diversity of citizenship requirement."
The result of the Stromberg court's interpretation is that only the main
plaintiff to the action must be diverse from the defendant, as well as satisfy the amount in controversy." 7 This blurs the line between class actions and multi-plaintiff actions. Although Comfort was of diverse citizenship from all defendants, 1 ' it does not seem the court would have
changed its decision even if Comfort had been non-diverse from the defendants.

163

See id.

164 See id.
16 See id.

See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 932. Although the court does not discuss it, the opinion
seems to imply that a material change in any one of these factors would have affected the
court's decision. Anything that lessened the appearance that these were related claims
would probably have hurt the argument favoring an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
167 See id.
'6 See 255 U.S. 356 (1921); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
169 See Supreme Tribe, 255 U.S. at 367.
170 See Freer, supra note 20, at 480 (making the point that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) extends the holding of Strawbridge to "upsloping" claims made under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 14(a)).
171 See Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 929-30. For diversity purposes, Stromberg and Comfort Control were considered citizens of Maryland, while Press Mechanical was a citizen
of Illinois. See id.
166
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B. After Stromberg
Stromberg is just a year old, and thus far has been cited in several
decisions stemming from the multidistrict litigation" regarding amino
acid lysine antitrust." In these cases, courts cite Stromberg for what it
does not say, rather than what it says."" The courts go out of their way
to declare that Stromberg does not stand for the principle that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 allows aggregation of claims among class action plaintiffs. 75
Such decisions illustrate that by noting what Stromberg does not stand
for, courts do not reject what it does stand for.
Generally, discussion of subsection (b)'s decimation of Strawbridge
76
is sparse in comparison to the amount of attention given other topics."

It seems that few commentators or judges will acknowledge the devastating effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 on both Strawbridge and Clark.17 Per172

Multidistrict litigation is a pretrial consolidation procedure whereby suits pending

in many different district courts are brought together in one district for pretrial proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1996). The rationale behind 28 U.S.C. § 1407 is judicial
economy, and it often used in airplane crash cases. See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air W.,
Inc. 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977).
Section 1407(a) of Title 28 states:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers
shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by
this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will
be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just
and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand
any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
173 See In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 927 F. Supp. 273, 275-76 (N.D. Ill.
1996) [hereinafter In re Amino 11(stating that neither Abbott nor Stromberg permits the
aggregation of different plaintiffs' claims to satisfy the amount in controversy); In re
Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1181, 1189 n.1 & 2 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
[hereinafter In re Amino Il] (same); see also Blair v. Source One Mortgage Serv. Corp.,
925 F. Supp. 617, 624 n.6 (D. Minn. 1996) (stating that the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §
1367 in Stromberg and Abbott does not reach as far as saying the statute permits supplemental jurisdiction when no plaintiff can meet the amount in controversy).
174 See In re Amino 1, 927 F. Supp. at 275-76; In re Amino 11, 918 F. Supp. at 1189
n.1 &2.
175 See In re Amino I, 927 F. Supp. at 275-76; In re Amino ii, 918 F. Supp. at 1189
n.1 &2.
176 See supra notes 19, 20 for a discussion of the more esoteric issues raised by the
inartful drafting of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
rn See Rowe, supra note 19, at 961 n.91. The first commentary on this point came
from the drafters of the statute in the final footnote of a law review article See id. Pro-
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haps most commentators felt the courts would accept the drafters' invitation to look to the legislative history. 78 While referring to the legislative

history may best effectuate the purported congressional intent, it forces
courts to label unambiguous language as ambiguous, thus twisting statutory interpretation to bizarre levels.
IV. THE COURTS, CONGRESS, AND THE FUTURE OF § 1367

This section suggests the proper method for a court to utilize when
interpreting subsection (b). Anything other than a literal reading of 28
U.S.C. § 1367 is improper because the language of the statute is unambiguous and does not call for an absurd result. Lower federal courts must

take into account what the United States Supreme Court mandates regarding statutory interpretation; thus, any session of statutory interpretation begins with the words of the statute. 79 While the Court's position
on the use of legislative history in regard to ambiguous statutes may not
be clear, this is not the case in regard to clear language." 8° Once the lan-

guage is deemed clear, the court must next determine if applying the statute literally would produce an absurd result.'

If not, the court must ap-

ply the statute as written.
Recently, in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., v. Casey" the
Court held that a statute is as much about what Congress intended it to
change as it is about what Congress intended it not to change."
The

Court explained that the best evidence of congressional intent is the language of the statute adopted by Congress and signed into law by the
President.'"

Also, the Court explained that if the language of a statute is

fessors Arthur and Freer spend some time on this issue, but not nearly as much as on
other, more law-school exam-like configurations. See supra notes 19, 53.
See generally Stromberg, 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing how 28 U.S.C. §
1367 has affected the validity of the holdings of Strawbridge and Clark).
178 See Rowe, supra note 20, at 961 n.91.
179 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117,
128 (1991) (noting that when interpreting a statute, the starting point is the language of
the statute itself); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992)
(same); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (same); Good
Samaratin Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2157 (1993) (noting that the "starting point
in interpreting a statute is its language"); United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc. 489 U.S.
235, 241 .(1989) (noting that the task of resolving a dispute over the meaning of a statute
begins "with the language of the statute itself").
180 See supra note 179.
181 See supra note 102 (for cases discussing what is an absurd result, and the importance of plain meaning).
'
499 U.S. 83 (1991).
l See id. at 98 (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987)).
'8
See id.
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plain, a court's only function is to enforce the statute by its terms." The
Court refused to allow individual legislators or committees to alter the
language of the statute as adopted.1 " Presumably this disfavor includes
non-legislative individuals, such as law professors, involved in the drafting of "corrective" legislative history."'
A.

The Courts and 28 U.S.C. § 1367
1. Interpreting the Rule 23 Omission

In the case of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the words are clear; there is no
ambiguity: class actions are simply not listed among the exceptions in

subsection (b).18 While the words of the statute are at odds with the
legislative history, the words of the statute are not incomprehensible in
and of themselves. 1' 9
It is not absurd to allow unnamed class members to litigate their
rights in the same case even if their claims fall below the jurisdictional

amount. The amount in controversy is not a constitutional requirement; it
is purely a statutory creation," and Congress could do away with the

amount in controversy requirement at anytime.
More importantly, the case that promulgated this prohibition of supplemental jurisdiction, Zahn, was decided as it was because the Court

was interpreting Rule 23, which was fairly new at the time of Zahn. 91

The Court did not hold that relieving unnamed class members from hav-

ing to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement was absurd; the
Court merely held that Rule 23 did not do so." 9 In other words, if the
Court interpreted Rule 23 differently, the amount in controversy requirement would not apply to unnamed class members. In dissent, Jus-

tice Brennan asserted that allowing such claimants into federal court is in

1s See id. at 99 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241
(1989); quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
186 See id. at 98-99.
187 See Rowe, supra note 20, at 960-61 n.90.
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367).
189 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (not precluding supplemental jurisdiction over
claims by unnamed class members who do not meet the amount in controversy requirement) with H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875 &
n. 17 (stating that Zahn's mandate requiring all class members to meet the amount in controversy requirement was to remain unaffected by the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also supra note 3 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332).
191 See Zahn v. International Paper, 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
"9 See id. at 301.
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the interest of justice and judicial economy." 9 If contemporary courts are
not saying Zahn survives because to abrogate Zahn would be absurd, they
must be saying that to abrogate Zahn in light of the legislative history is
absurd. Problems with this reasoning are discussed in Part IV.A.3.
2.

Interpreting the Rule 20 Omission

Courts interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in relation to the Rule 20
omission are faced with a statute that is clear, yet internally inconsistent." This inconsistency stems from the mention of Rule 19 and the absence of Rule 20 from the statute." There is no discussion of this in the
legislative history.'6 The statute is unequivocal in what it authorizes a
court to do: allow permissively joined plaintiffs" to use supplemental jurisdiction, yet preclude necessary and indispensable parties" 8 from doing
SO." 9 This plain language is unavoidable, unless the language calls for an
absurd result." Is it really absurd to allow the joinder of plaintiffs in a
case such as Stromberg? In light of fairness and judicial economy, it
certainly seems correct to allow Stromberg and Comfort to join as plaintiffs.
Because the language is clear and does not call for an absurd result,
courts should read the statute literally."' It may seem that moving from a
complete diversity requirement- diversity between all plaintiffs and all
defendants-to a minimal diversity requirement-diversity only between
main plaintiff and defendant-would clog the federal court system with a
multitude of suits previously unable to secure a federal forum. But this
may not be the case. Consider that in the seven years since the statute's
enactment, only a handful of cases have exploited the Rule 20 omission
because the configuration required is very, very narrow.
First, to invoke the original jurisdiction of the court on the basis of
diversity, there must be complete diversity between the named plaintiff

193
'94

See supra note 104.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §

1367).
"' See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367).
'9' See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875.
'97 See FED. R. Civ. P. 20; see also supra note 67 (for the text of Rule 20).
'" See FED. R. CIV. P. 19; see also supra note 64 (for the text of Rule 19).
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367).
200 See supra notes 102, 179 (for cases discussing the importance of reading the plain
meaning of a statute, and the importance of avoiding absurd results when doing so).
201 See supra notes 102, 179 (for cases discussing the importance of reading the plain
meaning of a statute, and the importance of avoiding absurd results when doing so).
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and all defendants,m and the main plaintiff must have a claim in excess
of $75,000.
Second, there must be an additional plaintiff whose claim
arises out of the same "transaction or occurrence. " ' Third, to fully exploit the Rule 20 omission, this additional plaintiff must be non-diverse
from a defendant.'
Finally, either a plaintiff or a defendant must desire
a federal forum enough to file in, or remove to, federal court.
3.

The Legislative History

In light of such clear language, it seems all courts would apply the
.statute as written, and would not need the legislative history. Courts,
however, have been quick to use the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. §
1367 to circumvent the plain language of the statute by reading the statute
as if the exceptions in subsection (b) contained Rule 23.6 While the use
of legislative history may have its place in statutory interpretation, °7 this
is not one such instance. For a court to disregard such plain statutory
language, the court should require a more reliable legislative history than
that corresponding to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
There was no congressional discussion on such an issue; some congresspersons may have approved of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because it did
away with Zahn and allowed for a more expansive use of class actions.
Given the lack of congressional consideration of this statute, however,
this seems unlikely.'
The fact remains that many courts ignore the plain
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367--the language passed by Congress and
signed by the President-in favor of a last-minute insert by academicians

See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) 267 (1806).
o See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also supra note 3 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.

202

§ 1332).
204

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §

1367).
M
Even Stomberg and Booty did not reach this far. Those cases only evaluated §
1367's effect on cases when the plaintiff's claim did not meet the amount in controversy.
Neither case actually ruled on a claim involving diversity of citizenship.
" See supra note 106.
27 See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S.CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992) (defending the use of legislative history in appropriate circumstances and also addressing the most common attacks on the use of legislative history).
2W See Fairman, supra note 54, at 165-70. The House Subcommittee on Courts held a
brief, half-day hearing on H.R. 5381, the House Bill which contained a draft of what
would become 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See id.at 165. Of the fifteen members of the subcommittee, only four were present. See id.& n.43. A mere nine witnesses testified
during the brief hearing, and of those, only four even mentioned supplemental jurisdiction. See id.at 165. The Judiciary Committee passed the House Bill by voice vote, and
the House passed it soon thereafter. See id.at 170. The Senate passed H.R. 5381 in one
day, and President Bush signed it just over a month later, on December 1, 1990. See id.
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This is not post-enactment legislative histo correct an "oversight.""
tory in the purest sense because the statute had not yet been signed into
law by the President. It is still, however, subsequent legislative history,
and is thus an oxymoron.2 10
Perhaps in 1990 Congress never even thought of Zahn, but since
then decided that it approves of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as written. To let the
courts know, should Congress feel compelled to enact the same wording
again? This seems redundant and wasteful. If the properly enacted laws
are not the voice, the intent, and the will of Congress, what is? Considering there is a backstop against absurd results, it seems nonsensical to
point to a statute and say, "this is the law," if the court's eyes are looking at legislative history.
Of course, a bigger issue remains: what to do with a statute barely
discussed by Congress, and a legislative history inserted into the congressional record after the fact. For now, the answer is to apply the statute
as written. This solution is not suggested to punish Congress for not
doing its job, but to force Congress to tell us what it wants. If decisions
such as Abbott continue and the statute remains untouched, the point may
be that Congress likes the statute just the way it is.211
Congress and 28 U.S.c. § 1367

B.

1.

What Congress Should Do About the Rule 23 Omission

Congress could add Rule 23 to the list of prohibitions in subsection
(b), or Congress could leave the statute as is and allow 28 U.S.C. §
1367 and Rule 23 to act as a gauntlet through which only certain diversity class action plaintiffs could use supplemental jurisdiction. The first
choice, simply adding Rule 23 to the list of prohibitions, would quickly
and cleanly preclude diversity class actions from involving claims of
plaintiffs that did not meet the amount in controversy requirement. Like
most easy solutions, this is too simplistic for the task at hand and looks
only to an arbitrary guide, the current amount in controversy, to keep
plaintiffs from being involved in a class action at the federal level that
2o9 See Rowe, supra note 20, at 960-61 n.90.

See Continental Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J.) (stating that the only value of legislative history is to the extent that it
illustrates the evolution of a statute, so that post-enactment legislative history is an oxy210

moron).
211 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 814 (2d ed. 1995) (noting

that failure by Congress to amend a statute may cause the courts to infer congressional
acquiescence of the previous judicial interpretations of the statute).
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justice may clearly dictate they should be involved in. Class actions are
complex legal creatures212 that involve the rights of many people, and the
purpose of a class action is to achieve justice, judicial economy, and the
best protection of all parties.
To achieve a result more in line with justice, it would be better to
judge the availability of supplemental jurisdiction on the nature of the
claims and the formation of the class itself. In the complex area of class
actions, it may seem as though this would be difficult to achieve, but it is
not. In fact, the legal framework is already.,there and represents Congress' second option: to allow 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Rule 23 to keep a
diversity class action out of federal court unless the nature of the action
meets a series of stringent standards. Taken together, 28 U.S.C. § 1367
and Rule 23 present the two tests for plaintiffs seeking supplemental jurisdiction.
Because 28 U.S.C. § 1367 deals with subject matter jurisdiction,
courts will typically perform an analysis under this statute before the discussion of class certification under Rule 23, so this becomes the first of
the two tests. The plaintiffs seeking supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) must persuade the court that the claims of the plaintiffs
seeking supplemental jurisdiction arose out of the "same case or controversy. "213
Subsection (c), however, contains four instances under which a
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction." 4 The plaintiff
must hope that the four discretionary items of subsection (c) either do not
apply, or if one does, that she can persuade the court not to exercise its
discretion to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
Passing the tests set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 means the court has
found subject matter jurisdiction over the case, not that there should be
class status. The battle for class certification" 5 may prove even more difficult.
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard,
C.J., dissenting) (calling the action before the court a "Frankenstein monster posing as a
class action"), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
213 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367).
21, See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367). Subsection (c) allows the court to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if:
a unique issue of state law is raised by the claim; the state law claim overshadows the
federal claim; all claims for which there are original federal jurisdiction have been dismissed; and, under rare circumstances, if other compelling reasons are present. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c).
215 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). Rule 23(c) states:
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
212
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While a complete discussion of Rule 23 is beyond the scope of this
Comment, relevant for purposes here are the numerous hurdles placed
before the parties seeking class status, and how those hurdles ensure that

only those class actions truly comporting with the purposes of class actions will survive in federal court.21

Subsection (a) of Rule 23 sets out

the four prerequisites to a class action, which are usually called numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.2 17

The Rule defines

each, respectively, as:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
parties will
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
218
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Subsection (a) of Rule 23 sets a very high standard that may not be
met even though the nature of the claims would make it seem so.219 Only

maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that
(A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe
those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and
who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of
this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c).
216 See DICKERSON, supra note 14, § 1.01 (summarizing the basic elements and use of
a class action).
217 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also supra note 14 (for the relevant text of Rule 23).
218 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
219 See generally In re Northern District of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products
Liability Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that women alleging harm from
the same contraceptive device could not join in a class action because there were differences in causation and the level of damages).
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after the group seeking class status makes this showing may the process
of certification proceed.'
Significantly, when formation of a class is done properly, the result
of the case can bind absent persons without ever giving them a chance to
opt-out of the lawsuit, or where the absent party never received actual
notice, but merely the best notice possible under the circumstances.221 If
the courts are willing to hold that a class action can bind parties not given
a chance to opt-out or never given actual notice, joinder under Rule 23 is
adequate to determine whether or not the plaintiffs' claims are related
closely enough that trying them together is in the interest of fairness and
judicial economy.
The numerous hurdles that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Rule 23 place before plaintiffs seeking class certification all relate to judicial economy and
the relation of the claims to each other. These are the standards that
courts should use to filter class actions out of federal court. These standards turn on factual questions related to the claims, unlike the arbitrary,
and purely statutory, amount in controversy. If supplemental jurisdiction
means anything, it should have some force when plaintiffs show that their
claims are so closely related that the claims can pass the collective
gauntlet of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Rule 23.
2.

What Congress Should Do About the Rule 20 Omission

The omission of Rule 20 is clearly a technical error.'
If Congress
wished to exclude supplemental jurisdiction from claims by plaintiffs
needed for proper adjudication,' Congress would certainly intend to bar
claims made by plaintiffs joined strictly for the sake of convenience. 2
On this point, Congress can do one of two things. First, and the least
likely, would be to remove Rule 19 from the section of the statute discussed here. This would, if nothing else, make the statute more sensible.
Congress is much more likely to add Rule 20 to the list of prohibitions in

22

See supra note 215 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the class certifica-

tion process).
221 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173, 178-79 (1974) (stating that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) mandates that individual notice be given to all
class members who can, with reasonable effort, be identified, and that the plaintiff must
bear the cost of such notice).
22 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th
Cir. 1996) (questioning if there is any sense in allowing supplemental jurisdiction over
claims by plaintiffs joined under Rule 20, but excluding such claims by plaintiffs joined
under Rule 19).
23

See FED. R. Civ. P. 19; see also supra note 64 (for the text of Rule 19).

27A See FED. R. Civ. P. 20; see also supra note 67 (for the text of Rule 20).
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This would make the statute more internally consistent

and would retain the complete diversity requirement.
V.

PRACTICAL LITIGATION CONCERNS

Until Congress amends the statute or the Supreme Court renders a
binding interpretation, what litigators should do with 28 U.S.C. § 1367
remains an open question. This Part highlights some factors litigators
should note because of 28 U.S.C. § 1367's effect on the jurisdictional
landscape.
A.

Removal

Removal is the process by which a defendant or group of defendants
change the forum of a case filed in state court to federal court.'
Other
than certain types of suits statutorily precluded from removal,' m any suit

225 See generally, John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1267
(1996). "Corrections Day," was introduced by Newt Gingrich in 1995. See id. at 1268.
The purpose of Corrections Day is to give Congress an expeditious method to correct
non-controversial errors in legislation. See id. at 1268-69. The usual methods for correcting statutes such as the frequent reauthorization of statutes, or appropriations riders,
are effective, but these processes are so cumbersome that some statutory errors are never
corrected, or go uncorrected for too long. See id. at 1270-80. It seems that the omission
of Rule 20 is a perfect candidate for Corrections Day because it is clearly an error and
the correction of it would probably not be considered a controversial piece of legislation.
Conversely, the omission of Rule 23 is controversial, and is thus not a good candidate for
Corrections Day. The correction of Rule 23 is better achieved through the normal legislative process that would allow for a more complete analysis of the issue.
226 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1996), which states:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. For purposes of
removal under this chapter the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such an action is brought.
227 See 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1996).
(a) A civil action in any State court against a railroad or its receivers or
trustees, arising under sections 51 to 60 of Title 45, may not be removed to
any district court of the United States.
(b) A civil action in any State court against a common carrier or its receivers or trustees to recover damages for delay, loss, or injury of shipments,
arising under section 11707 of Title 49, may not be removed to any district
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filed in state court is removable by defendants to federal court provided
the suit was initially eligible for a federal forum.'
If the removal is
based on diversity jurisdiction, there is a prohibition that no defendant
may reside in the state where the action commenced.2 The effect of 28
U.S.C. § 1367 on removed cases has been debated.'
1. Class Actions
Class action defendants are using the Rule 23 omission more often
to remove cases to federal court than plaintiffs are to file in federal

court." Considering that many class actions involve a group of plaintiffs
against a large corporate defendant, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 has given defendants in certain cases a way out of state court and into federal court
heretofore unavailable. Specifically, there are two diversity class action

court of the United States unless the matter in controversy exceeds
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
(c) A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court.of the
United States.
(d) A civil action in any State court arising under section 40302 of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 may not be removed to any district
court of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1445.
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441; see also supra note 226 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441).
m See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); see also supra note 226 (for the relevant text of 28
U.S.C. § 1441).
230 See Freer, supra note 20, at 485. There has been discussion of the statute's effect
on cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See id. Because subsection (b) of 28
U.S.C. § 1367 provides that the limits contained in that subsection apply to cases in
which jurisdiction is "founded solely on section 1332" the provisions of subsection (b)
may not apply to cases removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, because it is 28 U.S.C. § 1441
that is giving the court jurisdiction, not 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See id. It has been stated that
"original jurisdiction" is granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 when that statute is used to remove a case. See id. As support for this position, the statute states that it applies to cases
"commenced" after the effective date, as opposed to saying "commenced or removed" in
relation to the effective date. See id. If that were held to be the case, many of the cases
that exploited the Rule 23 omission would not have been possible.
But see Rowe, supra note 19, at 960 n.90. (noting that the drafters specifically address this concern by stating that a 28 U.S.C. § 1441 removal depends in itself on proper
original jurisdiction) In other words, there must be correct original jurisdiction before a
removal is attempted. See id.
231 See generally Free v. Abbott, Civ. A. No. 93-971 (M.D. La. 1994)(class action
where only the named plaintiffs met the amount in controversy, removed by defendant
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367); Gilmer v. Walt Disney Co., 915 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D.
Ark. 1996)(same); Borgeson v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 909 F. Supp. 709 (C.D.
Cal. 1995)(same); Neff v. General Motors Corp., 163 F.R.D. 478 (E.D. Pa.
1995)(same); Garcia v. General Motors Corp., 910 F. Supp. 160 (D.N.J. 1995)(same).
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for purposes here, these

33
shall be called The Zahn Configuration and The Snyder Configuration.2

The Zahn Configuration consists of a diverse named plaintiff with a
claim satisfying the amount in controversy requirement, as well as additional plaintiffs whose claims do not meet the amount in controversy. 3
Zahn held there was no federal jurisdiction over the claims of such unnamed members 35 Because Zahn precluded a case with such a configuration from being originally filed in federal court, the case was unremovable.3 6 Section 1367 of title 28 legislatively overruled the Zahn holding

by requiring only a named plaintiff to meet the diversity of citizenship
and amount in controversy requirements. Therefore, today a case configured exactly like Zahn could be removed, even though there are plaintiffs who fall below the jurisdictional amount?3 7
Even more monumental is 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)'s effect on The

Snyder Configuration. " The Snyder Configuration consists of a diversity class action with a diverse named plaintiff, but with no plaintiff

232

This is providing the plaintiff has not launched a preemptive strike and excluded

removal by choosing as the named plaintiff a party who is not diverse from the defendant.
If the plaintiff has done this, Strawbridge still controls and there is no original jurisdiction. The analysis would never reach supplemental jurisdiction. For plaintiffs attempting
to thwart removal, destroying diversity at the outset of the case is the most effective strategy.
233

THE ZAHN CONFIGURATION:

Citizenship
itlNew Jersey
7c2 XX
7t3 XX

Claim Amount*
$76,000
$5,000
$5,000

Citizenship
v. A New York

THE SNYDER CONFIGURATION:

Citizenship
Claim Amount*
Citizenship
New Jersey
$40,000
v. A New York
7r2 XX
$40,000
7t3XX
$40,000
"*" indicates the current amount-in-controversy of greater than $75,000.
"XX" indicates that the citizenship of other than the named class members is irrelevant
for the purpose of subject matter jurisdiction. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921)
234See supra note 233.
235See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Z6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); see also supra note 226 (for the relevant text
of 28
U.S.C. § 1441).
237 See supra note 231 (for cases configured similarly to Zahn that
were successfully
removed to federal court).
2M See supra note 233.
itl
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meeting the amount in controversy.2 9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, even
this type of suit may be removed. The success of removal, however,
hinges on the defendant's ability to attribute attorney fees to the named
plaintiff; if successful, this will usually swell the named plaintiff's claim
to over $75,000. With that done, the federal court has original jurisdiction over the named plaintiff's claim because she is diverse and her claim
exceeds the jurisdictional amount.'
Because 28 U.S.C. § 1367 allows
for supplemental jurisdiction in cases with plaintiffs joined under Rule
23 the defendant may remove. This method is becoming popular with
class action defendants. 2"

The ability to attribute attorney fees to a named plaintiff, however,
requires two elements: first, the forum state must have a statute allowing
for such; second, the circuit must not follow Goldberg v. CPC International, Inc. ,2 in which the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a state statute

allowing for the attribution of attorney fees to the named plaintiff in a
class action because it would be inconsistent with Zahn. 3 In a circuit
that follows Goldberg, this new method for removal has proven ineffective.'
In circuits not following Goldberg, the removal tactic has been
successful .2'
Realistically, the increased chance of removal does not mean that
fewer groups of plaintiffs will unite in class actions. While 28 U.S.C. §
1367 does take away a small amount of class action plaintiffs' rights to
choose their forum, this is not to imply that class action plaintiffs will

always end up in federal court when they prefer a state forum. Such
plaintiffs have procedural weapons.' " Even if a removal is effective,

239 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969) (holding that in a class action
where no plaintiff meets the amount in controversy, the plaintiffs may not aggregate their
claims in order to do so).
o See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also supra note 3 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332).
241 See supra note 231 (for cases configured similarly to Zahn that were successfully
removed to federal court).
242 678 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1982).
243 See id. at 1367. The court based its decision on the rationale that to hold otherwise
would be inconsistent with Zahn. See id.
2" See Karofsky v. Abbott Lab., 921 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D. Me. 1996) (holding that attorney fees should be shared by all members of the class).
245 See supra note 231 (for cases configured similarly to Zahn that were successfully
removed to federal court).
24 See supra note 232 (for a discussion of how plaintiffs may preclude any possibility
of removal).
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class action plaintiffs should not receive substantively different treatment

in federal court than they would in state court4
2.

7

Multi-Plaintiff Actions

The holding of Clark precluded a group of plaintiffs from joining
together for the sake of convenience in federal court based on diversity
unless each plaintiff satisfied the amount in controversy and the diversity
of citizenship requirements.'
Because the case could not be filed in federal court, it could not be removed. 4 9 Now, however, as long as the

main plaintiff is diverse and has a claim satisfying the amount in controversy, such a suit is removable.'
Perhaps surprisingly, the omission of Rule 20 has not been relied on
in many cases being filed in, or removed to, federal court. In Booty v.
Shoney's, Inc.,
which preceded Stromberg, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana permitted the removal, based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1367, of a multi-plaintiff case that would not have been
possible had Rule 20 been listed in the prohibitions of 28 U.S.C. §
1367(b). 5 2 Attorneys may be wary of attempting such an outright circumvention of the diversity statute, with only an arguable drafting error

to cite as statutory authorization. It may also be that few cases need to
exploit the Rule 20 omission. First, there must be complete diversity
between the main plaintiff and all defendants. Second, the main plaintiff's claim or claims must exceed the jurisdictional amount. Third, there

must be a second defendant whose claim arises out of the same
"transaction or occurrence."

3

Fourth, to fully test the Rule 20 omis-

247 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (stating that a federal court
sitting in diversity must apply the substantive rules of law for the state in which the court
sits).
2
See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969).
249 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1996); see also supra note 226 (for the relevant text of
28 U.S.C. § 1441).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367).
251 872 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D. La. 1995). In Booty, a woman sued a restaurant in state
court based on a slip and fall incident. See id. at 1526. Her husband joined a loss of
consortium claim claiming damages of less than the jurisdictional amount. See id. at
1527. The defendant removed and the court allowed it. See id. Because the wife was of
diverse citizenship and her claim exceeded $50,000, the district court had federal jurisdiction under the diversity statute and removal of her claim was proper. See id. More
important, the court found that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 granted the court supplemental jurisdiction to hear the loss of consortium claim because plaintiffs joined under Rule 20 were not
among the listed exceptions in subsection (b). See id.
252 See id.
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also supra note 10 (for the relevant text of 28 U.S.C. §
1367).
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sion, this new defendant must be non-diverse from the defendant and/or

have a claim for less than the amount in controversy. Finally, either the
plaintiffs or the defendant must desire a federal forum enough to test the
statute either by filing in federal court, or by removing.
B.

Sua Sponte
As courts of limited jurisdiction,' federal courts do not hesitate to
raise concerns regarding subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.. 5 The

jurisdictional concerns in Stromberg were raised sua sponte by the district court."5 6 This was also the case in Brazinski, which the Stromberg

court relied on."

The United States Supreme Court has raised subject

matter jurisdiction sua sponte on several occasions," including Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Mottley," 9 a seminal case regarding subject matter
jurisdiction,' and Clark v. Paul Gray Inc., 1 which affirmed the basic
rule that in multi-plaintiff actions all plaintiffs had to satisfy both the citi-

zenship and amount in controversy requirements.
The Rule 23 and 20 omissions both present the unpleasant possibility of dismissal from federal court due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Both sides may desire a federal forum, thus the parties may

make no objection to subject matter jurisdiction. Neither side may even
see any subject matter problems. This issue may be raised by the district
court, appellate court, or the United States Supreme Court. For practitioners, there is nothing more unsettling than knowing a case may be

dismissed because of something never raised by the parties, and some-

254 See supra note 39 (for the section of the Constitution outlining areas of jurisdiction
for the federal courts).
25 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).

256 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., No. 94-C6753, 1995
WL 387812 (N.D. I11.1995), affid in part, vacated in part, remanded in part, 77 F.3d
928 (7th Cir. 1996).
257 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th
Cir. 1996).
258 See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 287 (1938)
(mandating that a district court must dismiss or remand a case removed into federal court
if it appears to the district court, at any point in the proceedings, that there is no basis for
federal court jurisdiction); Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 13 (1930)
(addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the case at bar even though not
raised by the parties); M.C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (stating that
when a jurisdictional problem is found the limited power of a federal court requires the
court, on its own motion, to deny jurisdiction).
' 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
2o See id. at 152 (announcing the well-pleaded complaint rule).
"' 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
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thing not even in dispute among the parties. In the worst case scenario,
this may occur on appeal, after the expense of a trial.6 2
VI. CONCLUSION

Currently, the state of the law concerning supplemental jurisdiction
is unsettled and is ripe for either congressional intervention or Supreme
Court interpretation. In light of Abbott and Stromberg, one of these
seems imminent. The American Law Institute is currently considering a
draft to propose as an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.' If adopted in
2'62 See Arthur & Freer, supra note 53, at 1007 (stating that litigation over jurisdiction

is wasteful and that the legal community should have easily applied rules).
2
See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1997)
[hereinafter Tentative Draft].
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section(1) a freestanding claim is any claim for relief that is within the
original jurisdiction of the district courts independently of the jurisdiction conferred by this section;
(2) a pendent claim is a claim for relief, other than a freestanding
claim, that is joined in the complaint in a civil action and is part of
the same case or controversy as a freestanding claim to which the
pendent claim has been joined in the complaint;
(3) an ancillary claim is a claim for relief, other than a freestanding
claim or a pendent claim, that has been joined to the same civil action and is part of the same case or controversy as a freestanding
claim;
(4) the term "part of the same case or controversy as a freestanding
claim" means that the relationship between the freestanding claim
and the pendent or ancillary claim is such that the pendent or ancillary claim is within the judicial power that the United States may
exercise to adjudicate the freestanding claim pursuant to Article III
of the Constitution of the United States;
(5) the term "joined in the complaint" for purposes of the definition
of a pendent claim includes any claim joined in the complaint as
originally pleaded or as amended, any claim actually or constructively joined to the complaint by the pleading of a complaint or answer in intervention, and any claim otherwise joined to the complaint by order of the court; and
(6) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the
United States.
(b) General grant of supplemental jurisdiction.
Except as provided by subsection (c) or as otherwise expressly provided by
a statute of the United States, in any civil action in a district court of the
United States the court shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all pendent and ancillary claims. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(c) Restriction of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity litigation.
Except as provided in subsection (f), the supplemental jurisdiction conferred by subsection (b) shall not extend to a pendent or ancillary claim
based on its relationship to a freestanding claim that is within the original
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jurisdiction of the district court based on its relationship to a freestanding
claim that is within the original jurisdiction of the district court solely on
the basis of section 1332(a)(1) of this title and to which the pendent or ancillary claim has been joined in the same pleading, unless(1) the pendent or ancillary claim is asserted representatively by or
against a class of additional unnamed parties;
(2) the pendent or ancillary claim would be a freestanding claim on
the basis of section 1332(a) of this title but for the value of the
claim; or
(3) the pendent or ancillary claim has been joined to the action by
the intervention of an additional party whose joinder is not indispensable to the litigation of the action in the district court.
(d) Discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over pendent claims.
A district court should ordinarily exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
pendent claim, and may decline to do so only if considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants are insufficient to justify
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. The factors to be considered in
reaching such a determination include but are not limited to(1) whether a freestanding claim that is the basis for supplemental
jurisdiction over the pendent claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts;
(2) whether all freestanding claims that are the basis for supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent claim have been dismissed, and
if so, at what stage of the litigation;
(3) whether the pendent claim is closely tied to issues of federal
policy, and if not, whether issues of State law will substantially predominate in the determination of the pendent claim;
(4) whether the nature of the issues presented by the pendent claim
as opposed to any freestanding claim would, independently of jurisdictional considerations, justify trying the pendent claim separately
from the freestanding claim;
(5) whether adjudication of the pendent claim might avoid the need
to decide a question of federal constitutional law; or
(6) whether the district court would abstain from deciding the pendent claim were it a freestanding claim.
(e) Discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over ancillary claims.
A district court may not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
an ancillary claim unless(1) the sole basis for supplemental jurisdiction over the ancillary
claim is a freestanding claim permissively joined to the action in a
pleading other than the complaint and the nature of the ancillary
claim is such that the court would decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over it had it been joined to the freestanding claim as a
pendent claim; or
(2) all freestanding claims that are the basis for supplemental jurisdiction over the ancillary claim have been dismissed and no substantial proceedings have occurred with respect to the merits of the
ancillary claim; or
(3) there are other exceptional and compelling reasons for abstaining from exercising or otherwise declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.
(f) Joinder of additional defendant after removal.
Nothing in this section permits the dismissal or remand of any freestanding
claim except where, after removal of a civil action to the district court, the
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its present form, the new statute would codify the holdings of Abbott'
and Stromberg,'

and would vastly expand the availability of supple-

mental jurisdiction.'
Until Congress or the Supreme Court speaks, the effectiveness of
Strawbridge, Clark, and Zahn quite literally depends on where the case is
being heard. 7 Disparity in the law according to region is not wholly out

of the ordinary. Such widespread differences, however, in regard to the

plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to join a pendent claim against an
additional defendant that is subject to the jurisdictional restriction of subsection (c). With due regard for considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants, the district court may deny such joinder,
may permit such joinder and exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
pendent claim against the additional defendant, or may permit such joinder
and remand the entire action to the State court from which the action was
removed.
(g) Disposition of pendent and ancillary claims and tolling of period of
limitations when supplemental jurisdiction is lacking and declined.
When a district court lacks or declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a pendent or ancillary claim, the court shall dismiss the claim unless
the claim was joined prior to removal of the civil action to the district
court, in which case the district court shall remand the claim to the State
court from which it was removed. The period of limitations for the following claims shall be tolled for the period during which the claim was
pending and for a period of 30 days after it has been dismissed unless State
law provides for a longer tolling period(1) any pendent or ancillary claim dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction;
(2) any pendent or ancillary claim dismissed because the court has
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction;
(3) any other claim joined to the same action as a claim dismissed
or remanded on the grounds described in paragraph (1) or (2) of
this subsection that is voluntarily dismissed within 30 days after the
dismissal or remand of such claim; and
(4) any claim voluntarily dismissed within 30 days after the remand
of another claim in the same action under subsection (f), or within
30 days of the court's refusal to permit the joinder to the same action of a claim eligible for joinder under subsection (f).
264 See id. at (c)(1).
M See id. at (c)(2).
Currently subsection (b) prohibits a plaintiff from
266 See id. at 110-12, cmts (c)7-9.
using supplemental jurisdiction to assert a claim against a permissively joined defendant.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Under the ALl proposal, however, a plaintiff could use supplemental jurisdiction to assert a claim against a permissively joined defendant, provided
the claim was transactionally related to the claim invoking original jurisdiction. See Tenative Draft, subsection (c)(2). Thus, the proposal would codify Stromberg, and expand
its rationale by: (1) allowing a plaintiff to assert a transactionally related claim against a
permissively joined plaintiff; and (2) by allowing a permissively joined plaintiff to assert a
transactionally related claim against the original defendant. See id.
267 See supra Part II for a discussion of Abbott and Part III for a discussion of Stromberg.
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very power of a federal court need not, and should not, continue.'
If
our system is willing to hold that an objection to subject matter jurisdiction is so important that it cannot be waived,' or that a court can raise it
sua sponte,' practitioners need more than diametrically opposed interpretations and battling intellectuals in law reviews.
Michael A. Baldassare

See Arthur & Freer, supra note 53, at 1007.
29 See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1).
270 See supra note 258 (citing cases that discuss a federal court's duty to raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte).

